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Abstract
Background: Behavioral decision making literature suggests that decision makers are guided less
by final outcome than by immediate gain-loss. However, studies of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT)
under dynamic and uncertain conditions reveal very different conclusions about the role of final
outcome. Another research group designed a similar yet simpler game, the Soochow Gambling
Task (SGT), which demonstrated that, in dynamic decision making, the effect of gain-loss frequency
is more powerful than that of final outcome. Further study is needed to determine the precise
effect of final outcome on decision makers. This experiment developed two modified SGTs to
explore the effect of final outcome under the same gain-loss frequency context.
Methods: Each version of the SGT was performed by twenty-four undergraduate Soochow
University students. A large-value (± $200, ± $550 and ± $1050) and a small-value (± $100, ± $150
and ± $650) contrast of SGT were conducted to investigate the final outcome effect. The
computerized SGT was launched to record and analyze the choices of the participants.
Results: The results of both SGT versions consistently showed that the preferred decks A and B
to decks C and D. Analysis of learning curves also indicated that, throughout the game, final
outcome had a minimal effect on the choices of decision makers.
Conclusion:  Experimental results indicated that, in both the frequent-gain context and the
frequent-loss context, final outcome has little effect on decision makers. Most decision makers are
guided by gain-loss frequency but not by final outcome.
Background
Traditional economic theory defines a rational economic
decision as one intended to maximize monetary outcome
[1]. Nevertheless, the behavioral decision literatures [2-6]
generally agree that decision-making behavior is not
dependent on final outcome (long-term outcome, future
consequence, overall gain, and loss of stimuli in the long
run). These findings challenge traditional economic
notions such as expected value and expected utility.
In contrast with the questionnaire and thus descriptive
gambling tasks analyzed in conventional behavioral deci-
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sion studies, Bechara et al. [7,8] designed a dynamic four-
card game that substantially differed from the traditional
descriptive games. Subjects in this experience-based game
had no knowledge of the immediate value, probability, or
final outcome of the four choices. This game is the
renowned Iowa gambling task (IGT), which has been
applied in critical affective theory to test the Somatic
Marker Hypothesis (SMH). The SMH [7-13] suggests that
normal decision makers' choice pattern can be predicted
by the final benefit in the IGT [7,13,14], which is designed
to examine real-life decisions under uncertainty. In the
IGT, advantageous decks C and D confer relatively small
gains and losses than decks A and B do in each trial, and
both decks achieve a positive final outcome (+$250)
within an average of ten trials. Disadvantageous decks A
and B have relatively large gains and losses in each trial
and yield negative final outcomes (-$250) within an aver-
age of ten trials.
Damasio et al.[8,10,15] suggested that under conditions
of uncertainty, if decision makers rely on somatic markers
as indexed by skin conductance responses (SCRs) instead
of relying on logical reasoning [14], they can gradually
hunch the long-term benefit, i.e., choose more good decks
(decks C and D) than bad decks (decks A and B) overall.
However, damage to the somatic marker system can cause
the decision maker to make irrational and risky choices.
An example is the performance of subjects with ventrome-
dial prefrontal lesions. These subjects preferred bad decks
(decks A and B) rather than good decks (decks C and D),
and their anticipatory SCRs (before card turning) did not
significantly differ between good and bad decks [14,16-
18].
The IGT is widely used not only for neurological and psy-
chiatric assessment [19], but also to compare monetary
decision making between economic models [13,20,21].
Clearly, the two different approaches, behavioral decision
making (myopic to final outcome) and SMH (foresighted
to final outcome), yield very different conclusions regard-
ing the role of final outcome. Damasio and Bechara et al.
adopted a traditional economic perspective (foresighted
to final outcome) of final outcome in their investigation
of this dynamic-uncertain game.
The two approaches also differ in their standpoint to deci-
sion guiding (immediate frame vs. long-term calculation),
task context (certainty or risk vs. uncertainty), and task
process (description-based vs. experience-based).
A variation of the IGT developed by Chiu et al. [22,23],
namely, the Soochow gambling task (SGT), suggested that
normal decision makers are insensitive to final benefit
[24,25]. They also proposed that another controlling fac-
tor, namely, gain-loss frequency, can predict the decision
making behavior in SGT and elucidate some inconsistent
phenomenon in IGT [24,25]. Their results are inconsist-
ent with the serial findings of the Iowa group but are con-
sistent with the behavioral decision making literature
[3,6,26,27]. Normal decision makers are usually guided
by immediate gain-loss and are insensitive to final out-
come.
In SGT, decks A and B yield a bad long-term outcome (-
$500) but a high-frequency gain (eight gains (A: +$200, B:
+$100) two losses (A: -$1050, B: -$650)) in a block of ten
trials. Decks C and D yield good final outcomes (+$500)
but high-frequency losses (eight losses (C: -$200, D: -
$100), two gains (C: +$1050, D: +$650)) in a block of ten
trials (see Table 1). Chiu et al. found that decision makers
prefer decks A and B to decks C and D under uncertainty.
Most decision makers are insensitive to the final outcome
not only implicitly but also explicitly, on a mental
processing level [22,23] (see Figure 1). Gain-loss fre-
quency had a stronger effect on choice behavior than final
outcome did in the original SGT. Recently, this original
finding of SGT was replicated by the Indiana university
group [28] with a miniature value of SGT (original value
of SGT divided by 100, e.g., $250/100 = $2.50).
Normal decision makers may be guided by gain-loss fre-
quency rather than by final outcome. In the SGT context,
final outcome may be a subordinate factor in predicting
participants' behavior, but these results can not suggest
accordingly that final outcome has less effect in guiding
decision makers' choice. Although final outcome may be
a subordinate predictor of behavior in SGT, the results
indicate that it is still a major factor in decision making. A
fair experimental manipulation in SGT is to evaluate the
effect of final outcome by varying outcome under a con-
stant gain-loss frequency, namely, by manipulating the
final outcome variable under the same frequent-gain or
frequent-loss context (Table 2 and Figure 2). To properly
verify the effect of final outcome under the same fre-
quency context, this study tested two versions of SGT. In
both versions, decks A and B contained high-frequency
gains (eight gains, two losses), and decks C and D con-
tained high-frequency losses (two gains, eight losses).
However, on average, decks A and D conferred bad final
outcomes (-$500) and decks B and C conferred good final
outcomes (+$500) after ten trials. To control for the con-
trast effect, the values in the first version (large value ver-
sion) were ± $200, ± $550 and ± $1050, and those in the
second version (small value version) were ± $100, ± $150
and ± $650 (Table 2). In both versions, participants who
are insensitive to final outcome should have no prefer-
ence between decks A (D) and B (C). However, if final
outcome does significantly affect decision making under
the same frequency context, decks B (C) would outper-
form decks A (D) in card selection. Moreover, the large-Behavioral and Brain Functions 2009, 5:45 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/5/1/45
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and small-value versions differed in value contrast (large
value version: ± $200, ± $550 and ± $1050; small-value
version: ± $100, ± $150 and ± $650). The large-value ver-
sion situated the subjects in a relatively salient environ-
ment (large value contrast), and large losses (e.g., -$1050)
were rare. Conversely, the small-value version situated the
subjects in a relatively ambiguous environment (small-
value contrast) and infrequent low-risk (small value) loss
(e.g., -$650). If decision makers are easily influenced by
the salient environment (large-value contrast), hunching
the final outcome in the large-value version should be eas-
ier than in the small-value version. However, if subjects
navigate easily in low-risk situations, hunching should be
easier, and subjects should prefer the positive final out-
come decks in the small-value version.
Materials and methods
Forty-eight college students participated in this experi-
ment. Each version was performed by twenty-four sub-
jects (large-value version: ten males, thirteen females, and
one subject for whom gender was not recorded; small-
value version: eight males, sixteen females), and each sub-
ject completed one set of card arrangements (e.g., ABCD,
ACDB, ADBC, etc.) to control for the position effect.
According to the computerized version of the IGT [29],
the SGT was programmed with Matlab 6.5 to record sub-
ject choices. In this experiment, most procedures were
designed to follow the IGT administration procedure
[7,14,17], except that participants were polled every ten
trials after the first twenty trials to assess their subjective
feelings and strategies for approaching this game [14]. The
administration procedures included the original IGT
instructions and facsimile money shown on the computer
screen. Each gain or loss was summarized by bars in the
top panel. Most subjects were initially unfamiliar with the
internal gain-loss structure of gambles. Subjects were also
told to earn as much money as possible or to lose as little
money possible. However, none was apprised of the gam-
ble structure until the end of the game. In the post-game
questionnaire, the participants were asked to recall how
Mean number of four-card selections in original SGT Figure 1
Mean number of four-card selections in original SGT. These figures were adopted from Chiu et al. 2005 [23]. (a) Nor-
mal decision makers preferred decks A and B, which had high frequency gain, but bad long-term outcome (EV). (b) The post-
game questionnaire indicated that most subjects (20/24 subjects) preferred the bad EV decks in the concept stage. In the SGT, 
subjects were no longer implicitly guided by the EV and explicitly hunched the final outcome as suggested by Iowa group.
Table 1: Gain-loss structure in original SGT.
Deck Card Sequence A B C D
12 0 0 1 0 0 -200 -100
22 0 0 1 0 0 -200 -100
32 0 0 1 0 0 -200 -100
42 0 0 1 0 0 -200 -100
5 -1050 -650 1050 650
62 0 0 1 0 0 -200 -100
72 0 0 1 0 0 -200 -100
82 0 0 1 0 0 -200 -100
92 0 0 1 0 0 -200 -100
10 -1050 -650 1050 650
Final Outcome -500 ($) -500 ($) 500 ($) 500 ($)
Gain-loss Frequency 8 gains
2 losses
8 gains
2 losses
2 gains
8 losses
2 gains
8 lossesBehavioral and Brain Functions 2009, 5:45 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/5/1/45
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many cards they had selected from each deck after 100 tri-
als. The subjects were also asked to imagine a situation to
replay the same game. They were then asked to write
down the choice pattern over the four decks in this imag-
inary game.
Results
Empirical results indicated that participants made deci-
sions based on gain-loss frequency rather than by final
outcome. Most decision-makers preferred the high-fre-
quency gain decks (A and B) to the high final outcome
decks in both versions of SGT (Figures 3 and 4). In both
versions, gain-loss frequency significantly differed
between high-frequency gain decks (A, B) and high-fre-
quency loss decks (C, D) (large-value version: F (1, 23) =
46.62, p < .01; small-value version: F (1, 23) = 73.99, p <
.01). However, no statistically significant differences were
observed in the final outcome dimension (large-value ver-
Table 2: Gain-loss structure in the two modified versions of SGT.
Large Value (± 200) A B C D Small Value (± 100) A B C D
12 0 0 2 0 0 -200 -200 1 100 100 -100 -100
22 0 0 2 0 0 -200 -200 2 100 100 -100 -100
32 0 0 2 0 0 -200 -200 3 100 100 -100 -100
42 0 0 2 0 0 -200 -200 4 100 100 -100 -100
5 -1050 -550 1050 550 5 -650 -150 650 150
62 0 0 2 0 0 -200 -200 6 100 100 -100 -100
72 0 0 2 0 0 -200 -200 7 100 100 -100 -100
82 0 0 2 0 0 -200 -200 8 100 100 -100 -100
92 0 0 2 0 0 -200 -200 9 100 100 -100 -100
10 -1050 -550 1050 550 10 -650 -150 650 150
Final Outcome -500 ($) 500 ($) 500 ($) -500 ($) Final Outcome -500 ($) 500 ($) 500 ($) -500 ($)
Gain-loss Frequency 8 gains
2 losses
8 gains
2 losses
2 gains
8 losses
2 gains
8 losses
Gain-loss Frequency 8 gains
2 losses
8 gains
2 losses
2 gains
8 losses
2 gains
8 losses
Manipulation of the original SGT for further testing of EV Figure 2
Manipulation of the original SGT for further testing 
of EV. In the original SGT, decks A and B exhibited high-fre-
quency gain (eight gains, two losses) and negative EV (-$500), 
but decks A and B had different immediate values (+$200, -
$1050 vs. +$100, -$650). However, decks C and D exhibited 
high-frequency loss (two gains, eight losses) and positive EV 
(+$500) whereas decks C and D had different immediate 
value (-$200, +$1050 vs. -$100, +$650). The present modi-
fied versions were generated by separating the immediate 
values obtained from decks A and C from those obtained 
from decks B and D. Large- and small-value versions were 
prepared to clarify the effect of EV and value contrasts.
Mean number of four-card selections in large-value version of  SGT Figure 3
Mean number of four-card selections in large-value 
version of SGT. Participants preferred decks A and B to 
decks C and D. No significant effects were observed 
between decks A and B or between decks C and D. Gain-
loss frequency had a far more powerful guiding effect. The EV 
did not significantly affect decision makers, even in the same 
gain-loss context.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2009, 5:45 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/5/1/45
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sion: F (1, 23) = 3.15, p = .09; small-value version: F (1,
23) = 0.07, p = .80) or in the interaction between two fac-
tors (gain-loss frequency × final outcome) (large value
version: F (1, 23) = 0.76, p = .39; small value version: F (1,
23) = .49, p = .49).
The learning curve indicated that, throughout the game,
participants preferred decks A and B to decks C and D (Fig-
ures 5, 6). The learning curves for frequent-gain decks (A
and B) were always above those of the frequent-loss decks
(C and D). A three-factor (repeated measurement)
ANOVA test of the learning curve was conducted. The five-
block lines in Figures 5 and 6 show that, in both versions,
decks A and B dominated the choices made by subjects.
(large-value version: F (1, 23) = 46.62, p < .01; small-value
version: F (1, 23) = 73.99, p < .01). In comparison, there
are few significant main effects of final outcome (Figures
7 and 8) or interaction effects in both versions. Table 3
shows the statistical parameters. Notably, deck B was
gradually preferred over deck A under the high-frequency
gain context of small-value version (Figure 6). Neverthe-
less, the card selection curves of decks C and D were still
far below those of decks A and B. No-cross over effect was
observed across five blocks. The questionnaire survey
results were consistent with the behavioral selection in
both versions. In the memory evaluation, the participants
correctly recalled that they chose decks A and B more fre-
quently than they chose decks C and D in both versions
(Figure 9). The subjects were then asked to imagine how
they would allocate the choice pattern over the four decks
if they are allowed to play the same game again. The hypo-
thetical reallocation also showed that the participants pre-
ferred decks A and B to decks C and D (Figure 10).
Discussion
This study showed that gain-loss frequency is the main
guiding factor under uncertainty and that change in final
outcome under the same frequency context does not sig-
nificantly alter choice behavior. In both versions of the
SGT, selections between decks A and B did not signifi-
cantly differ from those between decks C and D. Normal
Mean number of four-card selections in small-value version  of SGT Figure 4
Mean number of four-card selections in small-value 
version of SGT. Even under varying monetary value (± 
$100, ± $150 and ± $650), the current version of SGT repli-
cated the large-value version of SGT. Most subjects chose 
the high-frequency gain decks (A and B) rather than the high-
frequency loss decks (C and D).
Table 3: Statistical analysis (ANOVA) of learning curves in the 
two modified versions of SGT
Large value F Hypothesis df Error df p
FREQUENCY 46.62 1.00 23.00 0.00
OUTCOME 3.15 1.00 23.00 0.09
BLOCK 0.00 1.00 23.00 1.00
FRE * OUT 0.76 1.00 23.00 0.39
FRE * BLOCK 3.29 4.00 20.00 0.03
OUT * BLOCK 1.11 4.00 20.00 0.38
FRE * OUT * BLOCK 0.67 4.00 20.00 0.62
Small value F Hypothesis df Error df p
FREQUENCY 73.99 1.00 23.00 0.00
OUTCOME 0.07 1.00 23.00 0.80
BLOCK 147.68 2.00 22.00 0.00
FRE * OUT 0.49 1.00 23.00 0.49
FRE * BLOCK 3.64 4.00 20.00 0.02
OUT * BLOCK 2.41 4.00 20.00 0.08
FRE * OUT * BLOCK 3.21 4.00 20.00 0.03
Learning curve of five blocks in large-value version of SGT Figure 5
Learning curve of five blocks in large-value version of 
SGT. Each block consisted of twenty trials depicting prefer-
ences for four decks. The learning curves of four decks 
showed that frequent-gain decks A and B were preferred by 
normal decision makers from the beginning until the end of 
the game. No significant differences were observed between 
decks A and B or between decks C and D.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2009, 5:45 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/5/1/45
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decision makers were apparently attracted by the high-fre-
quency gain decks (A and B) (Figures 5 and 6) and were
unaware of the value of final outcome throughout the
game (Figures 7 and 8). It is worth noting that according
to the observation of Figures 6 and 8, the participants
seem to be gradually sensitive to the change of final out-
come between the two high-frequency gain decks A and B.
The salient situation (large-value contrast) did not facili-
tate the ability to hunch the final outcome. However, the
low-risk situation (small-value contrast) did give decision
makers flexibility to explore the ambiguous environment.
Therefore, the subjects could enter the hunch state rela-
tively easily. This phenomenon implies that participants
enter a hunch state when given useful cues in the relatively
simple structure of the game but then change from an
uncertainty state to a risky-decision state over time. The
crossover learning curve between decks A and B in the
small-value version remains to be identified. The data
indicate that, in certain contrast contexts, when partici-
pants are still restraining in their choice over decks C and
D (see Figures 3 and 4), they may have more time (trials)
to compare the final benefit between decks A and B. The
fact that decision makers were insensitive to final out-
come or to EV (Expected Value) is consistent with the
behavioral decision making literature [2,3,5,6,26,30].
Lichtenstein and Slovic [27] demonstrated that even the
experimenter taught the decision makers about the infor-
mation of final outcome, but this manipulation did not
cause subjects to choose more on the higher final out-
come selection. That is, the "EV inertia" rationality issue is
very difficult to explain by traditional economic concepts.
Although some experimental economists have acknowl-
edged this phenomenon and have proposed solutions,
the problem is still hotly debated between psychologists
and economists [30].
However, the strong claim of SMH that is supported by
bulky evidence from IGT, the Iowa group seems unno-
ticed of the EV inertia findings in decision literature.
Instead, the SMH reconsidered the EV argument by intro-
ducing the interactive role of emotion. The SMH proposed
that decision makers can foresee the benefit of final out-
come under uncertainty with the help of emotion in an
implicit way. The claim of SMH contradicts the findings of
behavioral decision research. This claim also revolution-
Learning curves of five blocks in small-value version of SGT Figure 6
Learning curves of five blocks in small-value version 
of SGT. In this version of SGT, participants were preferred 
to choose frequent-gain decks A and B. Decks A (D) and 
B(C) had the opposite final outcome, but both decks showed 
the similar pattern of choices, which lasted until the end of 
the game. Decks A and B did not significantly differ, but the 
data revealed a crossover learning curve between decks A 
and B.
Average of learning curves based on final outcome in large- value version of SGT Figure 7
Average of learning curves based on final outcome in 
large-value version of SGT. Bad final outcome curve 
(A+D) was almost overlapped by the good final outcome 
curve (B+C). These statistical results showed that partici-
pants were insensitive to EV in these dynamic games even in 
the same gain-loss context.
Average learning curves based on final outcome in small- value version of SGT Figure 8
Average learning curves based on final outcome in 
small-value version of SGT. The final outcome curves of 
this version virtually replicated those of the large-value ver-
sion. However, decision makers gradually shifted their pref-
erences from the bad final outcome decks to the good final 
outcome decks. The learning effect was mainly contributed 
by decks A and B. This phenomenon indicates that final out-
come may affect decision making in a relative low-risk con-
text.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2009, 5:45 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/5/1/45
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izes concepts of emotion in psychology and neuroscience.
SMH corresponds to the basic concept of final outcome in
traditional normative economics, which proposes that
decision-makers act rationally to optimize their final out-
come. Additionally, SMH proposes that emotional
somatic markers, like SCRs, can help avoid bad choices so
that long-term benefits can better be pursued under uncer-
tainty.
Nevertheless, in a similar uncertainty context, both SGT
versions demonstrate that the claim of the original SMH
is unsupported in these uncertain and dynamic games. At
both the implicit (Figures 3 and 4) and explicit (Figures 9
and 10) levels, decision-makers cannot precisely aggregate
their gain-loss experience by value calculation across
block trials. This study suggests that the somatic system
resembles an internal bank within the human body. Its
revenue and expenditure depend on frequency of gain
and loss [19].
Above observations indicate that final outcome is hardly
an accurate predictor in guiding card selection behavior.
The results simply demonstrate the important role of
gain-loss frequency in guiding decision behavior under
uncertainty. Notably, studies of IGT and SGT [28,31] have
all analyzed dynamic and uncertain situations, namely sit-
uations in which subjects were unaware of the internal
structure of gambles.
Nevertheless, some studies [23,32] indicate that subjects
gradually choose good decks and hunch the final out-
come progressively in a relatively certain situation in
which subjects can infer the gain-loss probability and
value distribution. Therefore, contextual information may
Post-experimental memory assessment for both versions of SGT Figure 9
Post-experimental memory assessment for both versions of SGT. After the game, subjects were asked how many 
cards they chose from each of the four decks. Decks A and B were preferred to decks C and D.
Hypothetical assignment of 100 additional trials for both versions of SGT after the game Figure 10
Hypothetical assignment of 100 additional trials for both versions of SGT after the game. Subjects were asked, 
"Suppose you were allowed to play the same game again. How would you allocate your choices for the four decks?" The 
response also showed that respondents would have favored decks A and B.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2009, 5:45 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/5/1/45
Page 8 of 9
(page number not for citation purposes)
trigger different decision systems that guide choice behav-
ior.
The frequency effect and probability learning [33] are
commonly observed phenomena in various decision and
animal studies [34-38]. The insensitivity to final outcome
is observable not only in dynamic SGT games. Many deci-
sion studies have demonstrated similar phenomena in
various gambles. For instance, Barron and Erev stated that
the insensitivity of decision makers to final outcome is
due to the underweighting of rare events [35,38].
Ahn et al. confirmed a frequency effect in IGT and the
validity of the SGT for assessing behavioral level or mod-
eling level [28]. They applied prospect theory [3,6,26] to
explain how frequent small losses override infrequent
large losses in the SGT. To obtain congruent predictions
using IGT and SGT, Ahn et al. modified their "expectancy
utility function" [39] with the "prospect theory" [3,26]
after a reevaluation of SGT.
The dominance effect of gain-loss frequency in the IGT
and SGT has also been reported under these dynamic-
uncertain situations [40-42]. The present observation is
consistent with numerous behavioral-analysis studies that
suggested the schedule of reinforcement determines the
pattern of choice behavior [43-46]. Some pioneering
researchers [47,48] in behavioral analysis have illustrated
that
"....the relation between a response and a later reinforcer
contributes to responding only if no other reinforcers
intervene; in other words, each reinforcer blocks
responses that precede it from the effects of later reinforc-
ers....." (Catania et al, 1988)
Like IGT and SGT, therefore, the relationship between
each reinforcer (gain) and response (choice) in uncertain
conditions is easily blocked and biased by other interven-
ing stimuli and reinforcers (e.g., other decks, different val-
ues of gains or losses). This observation satisfactorily
explains why the choice patterns of most subjects are
dominated by immediate gain and loss: the causal rela-
tionship between the stimulus and reinforcement is diffi-
cult to conceptualize.
Further experimental investigations are needed to clarify
both the insensitivity of final outcome and gain-loss fre-
quency effect, particularly the concurrent schedule with
reinforcement and punishments for decision making
under uncertainty.
Conclusion
The effect of gain-loss frequency was substantially larger
than that of final outcome in both versions of SGT. The
present observation correlates with numerous behavioral
analysis studies [47] suggesting that the reinforcement
schedule determines the pattern of choice behavior. This
study demonstrates that subjects are insensitive to differ-
ences in final outcome given a similar (gain-loss) fre-
quency context in both versions of SGT (large-value
contrast and small-value contrast). Instead, subjects are
significantly guided by gain-loss frequency under the
same final outcome context. Most participants preferred
high-frequency gain decks to high final outcome decks.
However, it is worth noting that final outcome had a
greater effect under the same context of high-frequency
gains (A, B) in the small-value version. An intriguing issue
requiring further study is decision making behavior under
conditions other than uncertainty. Providing effective
contextual information concerning the internal structure
of the decision task may transform an uncertainty game
into a risky choice task. Hopefully, future studies can fur-
ther elucidate the relative contribution of gain-loss fre-
quency and final outcome under the risk or certain
situation as well as manipulating other value contrasts of
immediate and long-term gain-loss.
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